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I. INTRODUCTION
By the late 1960s, the waters of the United States were in an envi-
ronmental crisis.1  To put it lightly, governmental intervention to stop
a downward spiral of environmental degradation was becoming in-
creasingly necessary.2  To frame it in more dire (and perhaps, more
accurate) terms, the need for significant environmental legislation ad-
dressing surface water quality had become the most pressing public
health issue of a generation.3
The infamous burning of northeast Ohio’s Cuyahoga River on June
22, 1969, in Cleveland sparked public concern for the state of the na-
tion’s waterways, and galvanized public interest in environmental
protection efforts.4  On that date, a fire broke out on the river when
1. Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of
the Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Con-
trol Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99–100 (2010).
2. See id. (discussing one scholar’s view on the need for public action to improve
water quality as the 1960s drew to a close).
3. Id. at 99–101 (“According to Hines, most of the surface waters within the United
States were only marginally suitable for even low-quality uses such as irrigation,
stockwatering, and industrial intake . . . .  Hines cited to warnings by public
health officials that water pollution rendered the country vulnerable to serious
health problems arising from ‘the disease carrying capacity of our polluted water-
courses.’”).  The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, popu-
larly known as the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)), was in no way the first federal foray
into regulation of navigable surface waters.  Federal regulation of surface waters
began with the passage of the Rivers and Harbors Act in 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat.
1121 (1899), which regulated “projects and activities in navigable waters and
harbor and river improvements, such as placing dredged or fill material in water-
ways, altering channels, and constructing dams, bulkheads, jetties, and other
structures.” Introduction to the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY 3–4, http://cfpub.epa.gov/watertrain/pdf/modules/introtocwa.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/FAE3-UHJM].
4. Introduction to the Clean Water Act, supra note 3, at 3; Christopher Maag, From
the Ashes of ’69, a River Reborn, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes
.com/2009/06/21/us/21river.html?_r=0.  Most observers consider the Cuyahoga
fire, among other environmental disasters, to be one of the most influential
events leading up to the passage of Clean Water Act in 1972. Id. (“The Cuyahoga
River fire was a spark plug for environmental reforms around the country.”); Dan
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“oil-soaked debris” floating on the river’s surface ignited.5  The fire
was extinguished in thirty minutes and lead to less than $50,000 in
damage, but caused Cleveland considerable public embarrassment.6
Despite the attention it brought to the Cuyahoga’s environmental deg-
radation, the 1969 burning was not an isolated or novel event.  There
were, in fact, thirteen fires on the Cuyahoga beginning around 1868.7
The largest Cuyahoga fire had occurred seventeen years earlier, in
1952, causing damages topping $1 million.8  Perhaps worse than the
flammable floating milieu of debris, entire stretches of the Cuyahoga
were entirely devoid of fish in the 1950s and 1960s.9
Congress responded to water pollution problem by passing the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,10 popularly
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA).11  Among the CWA’s ambitious
goals were to eliminate “discharge of pollutants” into navigable water-
ways by 1985; achieve water quality that protects fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and allows for recreation “in and on the water” wherever pos-
sible by July 1983; and to expedite creation of programs to control
non-point sources of pollution.12
Today, the Cuyahoga is billed as a success story.  More than forty-
five years after the 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga and forty years after
passage of the CWA, there has been considerable improvement in the
Bobkoff, Ohio’s Burning River in Better Health 40 Years Later, NPR (June 22,
2009, 11:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105750
930.
5. Maag, supra note 4.
6. Id. (“The fire turned Cleveland into ‘The Mistake by the Lake,’ a national
punchline that would endure for decades.”).  Perhaps more concerning is that the
1969 burning was not an isolated or novel event.  There were, in fact, 13 fires on
the Cuyahoga beginning as early as 1868.  The largest Cuyahoga fire had oc-
curred more than 15 years earlier, in 1952, causing damages topping $1 million.
Introduction to the Clean Water Act, supra note 3, at 3.
7. Introduction to the Clean Water Act, supra note 3, at 3; see also Bobkoff, supra
note 4 (“Never mind that in the middle of the 20th century, rivers in industrial
cities caught on fire all the time.”).
8. Introduction to the Clean Water Act, supra note 3, at 3.  A famous photo of the
burning of the Cuyahoga River ran one month after the 1969 fire on the cover of
TIME Magazine.  According to the Center for Public History & Digital Humani-
ties at Cleveland State University, the cover photo (which depicts flames en-
gulfing a ship) was not even a photo of the 1969 fire, but rather a photo of the
much more serious conflagration of November 1952.  Michael Rotman, Cuyahoga
River Fire, CLEVELAND HISTORICAL, http://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show/
63#.Vep8xhFVhBd [https://perma.unl.edu/P4WH-MXF9].  Interestingly, Rotman
writes that no known photos of the 1969 blaze exist. Id.
9. Introduction to the Clean Water Act, supra note 3, at 3.
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816.
11. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 100.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
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river’s water quality.13  The Cuyahoga turnaround is just one example
of significant environmental improvement in U.S. waters.  The CWA is
now credited with reducing discharge of pollutants into the nation’s
waters, leading to significant water quality enhancements.14  As of
2004, discharge of organic wastes from municipal waste treatment fa-
cilities dropped 46%, and similar discharges from industry sources
have dropped by an astounding 98%.15  Progress in industrialized ur-
ban areas has been the most dramatic, as these areas have benefitted
the most from the CWA’s permitting of point source discharge.16  An-
nual wetlands loss—presumably from activities including depositing
fill materials—fell 77% by 1997 from average annual losses in the
mid-1970s to 1980s (calculated as a decade-long average).17  Of the
three “iconic statutes” of environmental reform, the Clean Air Act of
197018, National Environmental Policy Act of 196919, and the Clean
Water Act, many environmental law experts believe that the CWA was
the “best designed and most artfully drafted.”20
However, according to some commentators, continued progress will
require more aggressive control of non-point source pollution and wet-
lands degradation.21  Most observers believe the EPA has not
13. See Maag, supra note 4 (“Today, the Cuyahoga is home to more than 60 species of
fish . . . .”); see also Bobkoff, supra note 4 (noting that the EPA considers parts of
the river fully restored).
14. William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Suc-
cess?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 538 (2004).
15. Id. at 591.
16. See id.
17. For a ten-year period running from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, the U.S. exper-
ienced annual averages wetlands losses of 254,770 acres per year.  For an eleven-
year period running from 1986 to 1997, U.S. losses fell to 58,545 acres per year.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT 17 tbl.1-1 (2001).  Over the same period, wetlands losses stem-
ming from agriculture fell from about 138,000 annually to about 15,000 acres
annually. Id. at 17.
18. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
19. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970).
20. N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How the
1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Re-
form, GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L., Summer 2013, at 80, 80.
21. See Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 133 (“Two prominent environmental
law scholars have drawn the conclusion that ‘one inevitably is left with the con-
clusion that politics has driven the CWA’s failure to take on nonpoint pollution in
any meaningful way.’”).
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achieved its stated policy goal of “no net loss” of wetlands22 for various
reasons, including limitations on jurisdiction inherent in the CWA.23
In Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,24 the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals considered whether judicial review was availa-
ble immediately following an adverse CWA jurisdictional
determination concluding that the Hawkes Co. property constituted
wetlands subject to Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) regulation.25
Resolution of that question first required the court to decide whether a
jurisdictional determination made by the Army Corps of Engineers
under the CWA is a “final agency action” for which judicial review is
available under section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act.26
Second, the court had to decide the related—but distinct—question of
whether the claim was ripe for judicial review.27  In a unanimous
judgment,28 the Eighth Circuit panel held that: (1) a jurisdictional de-
termination was a final agency action within the meaning of Sec-
tion 704; and (2) plaintiff Hawkes Co.’s claim was ripe for review.
Notably, this decision conflicted with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers29—rendered during pen-
dency of the Hawkes Co. appeal on nearly identical facts30—and the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.31
22. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 2–3.  Since the administration of
George H.W. Bush, it has been the stated policy of the administration to achieve
“no net loss” of wetlands. Id.; Wetlands, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT. RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/
water/wetlands/ [https://perma.unl.edu/XTT9-BWG7].
23. Andreen, supra note 14, at 545–46 (arguing the continuing loss of wetlands is due
to a number of factors, including “less than aggressive enforcement” and the
“problems of jurisdiction,” that is, the scope of the dredge-and-fill permit program
created by the CWA).
24. 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes
Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
25. A party seeking clarification as to whether property is subject to Clean Water Act
jurisdiction may ask the Army Corps of Engineers to make a jurisdictional deter-
mination (sometimes called a “wetlands delineation”).  An approved jurisdictional
determination is subject to administrative appeal.  See generally 33 C.F.R.
§§ 331.1–331.3 (2015) (describing jurisdictional determinations and the adminis-
trative appeal of such determinations).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
27. See Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 1002.
28. Judge Loken wrote the majority opinion, which Judge Bright joined.  Judge Kelly
filed a concurring opinion. See id.
29. 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014).
30. See id.  Like the plaintiffs in Hawkes Co., Belle Co. sought a permit under the
CWA’s section 404 dredge-and-fill permit program.  Belle sought to use the prop-
erty as a solid-waste landfill.  When they received an adverse jurisdictional deter-
mination, Belle sought review under § 704 of the APA. Id. at 386–88.
31. 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008).
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This Note will analyze the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Hawkes Co.
in light of the Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence, focusing its at-
tention on the Section 704 finality issue, since the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that justiciability analysis was coextensive with the analysis it
completed to resolve the finality issue.32  This Note concludes that the
Eighth Circuit correctly held that judicial review was available in
Hawkes Co.
To facilitate an understanding of the practical implications of the
Hawkes Co. decision, Part II of this Note explores jurisdiction under
the CWA, including recent EPA rulemaking efforts which have been
met with resistance from diverse areas of industry.  Further, Part II
also examines the availability of judicial review of agency actions
under the Administrative Procedure Act, including relevant Supreme
Court precedents on what constitutes a “final agency action” under
Section 704.
Part III will turn to the Hawkes Co. case, discussing the facts of the
case, the district court’s ruling, the case’s procedural posture on ap-
peal, and the majority opinion.  Judge Kelly’s concurring opinion,
which raises compelling points regarding the legal doctrine at work in
the Hawkes Co. case is also discussed.
Finally, Part IV argues that the Supreme Court was justified in its
decision to grant certiorari to resolve the core issue of finality in the
Hawkes Co. case, and that the Court should avoid a 4–4 decision
which would leave the conflict between the circuit courts unresolved.
Further, this Note takes the position that the Court should explicitly
extend its holding in Sackett v. EPA33 to cover threshold determina-
tions of jurisdiction, making judicial review of adverse jurisdictional
determinations immediately available to property owners.
II. BACKGROUND
While this Note will focus its attention and analysis on the proce-
dural issues inherent in landowner challenges to jurisdictional deter-
minations under the CWA, an understanding of the underlying
jurisdictional controversy adds depth and context for understanding
the practical impact of these administrative challenges.34
32. See infra text accompanying note 85.
33. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
34. As Justice Scalia put it in his majority opinion in Sackett, readers “will be curi-
ous, however, to know what all the fuss is about.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
While a more concise treatment of this case might have avoided the substantive
disputes underlying the procedural issues in this case, this Note takes the posi-
tion that the practical effects of allowing (or disallowing) judicial review are es-
sential to any court’s decision on § 704 finality. See infra section IV.B.
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A. The Clean Water Act’s Jurisdictional Uncertainty
The provisions of the CWA generally apply to the “navigable wa-
ters” of the United States.35  Of course, “navigable waters” takes a dif-
ferent meaning today than it did in the Clean Water Act’s predecessor
statute.  “Navigable waters” no longer means “navigable in fact or
readily susceptible of being rendered so,” as had been the interpreta-
tion of that phrase in the Clean Water Act’s predecessor statute.36
Section 502(7) of the CWA defines navigable waters to include all “wa-
ters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”37  The mean-
ing of this phrase, and in turn the extent of the CWA’s reach, has been
the subject of significant disputes.38
While uncertainty still remains, the meaning of “waters of the
United States” has been clarified by a few Supreme Court decisions.
First, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,39 presented the
Court with the question of whether a wetland adjacent to a “navigable
water” was subject to Corps’ jurisdiction under the Act.  In Riverside,
the Corps’ interpretation asserted that the regulatory definition of
“waters of the United States” operative at that time extended its juris-
diction under the CWA to “all wetlands adjacent to navigable or inter-
state waters and their tributaries.”40  The Court found the Army
Corps’ interpretation to be reasonable and supported by the statutory
grant of authority, because Congress’s choice to define “navigable wa-
ters” as the “waters of the United States” indicated an intent to regu-
late “at least some waters” which would not have been considered
“navigable” in the usual sense of the term.41  In Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,42 the Court
held that the Army Corps exceeded its authority under the CWA by
promulgating a rule that extended the definition of “navigable waters”
to include intrastate waters which provide or would provide “habitat
for migratory birds.”43
35. For example, section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), requires those
seeking to deposit “dredge or fill materials” into the “navigable waters” to obtain
a permit.
36. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006).
37. Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723.
38. See generally Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724–29 (recounting the ever expanding and
retracting definition of “waters of the United States” through the Corps’ and
court actions).  For additional discussion of the Corps and EPA’s recent rulemak-
ing defining “waters of the United States,” see infra section II.B of this Note.
39. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
40. Id. at 129.
41. Id. at 132–34.
42. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
43. Id. at 167.  Petitioners in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County sought a
permit under Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), to
discharge dredged or fill material into “navigable waters.” Id.
284 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:277
After Riverside Bayview, the Army Corps continued to search for
the limits of its regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA, forcing the Su-
preme Court to again address the propriety of a regulation construing
“waters of the United States.”  In Rapanos v. United States,44 the
Court considered whether a wetland eleven to twenty miles from the
nearest body of navigable water could be considered a wetland adja-
cent to waters of the U.S. under the then-effective regulation.45  A plu-
rality of four justices announced a new standard for determining if a
wetland was “adjacent” to a “water of the United States,” holding that
for the wetland in question to be covered, it must share a continuous
surface connection to a “relatively permanent body of water connected
to traditional interstate navigable waters.”46  Justice Kennedy’s con-
curring opinion announced a different standard, the “significant
nexus” test.  In his view, the Corps must “establish a significant nexus
on a case-by-case basis” when it seeks to regulate wetlands adjacent to
non-navigable tributaries.47  Currently, the Circuit Courts of Appeals
apply different standards, with some applying only Justice Kennedy’s
test, some applying the Kennedy test and leaving the validity of the
plurality’s standard for another day; still others, including the Eighth
Circuit have held that jurisdiction exists if either standard is satisfied,
and two more circuits have avoided the issue by holding that the wet-
land at issue would satisfy either test.48
44. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
45. Id. at 722–25.
46. Id. at 742.
47. Id. at 782.
48. ROBERT MELTZ & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33263, THE
WETLANDS COVERAGE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA): Rapanos and Beyond 7 &
nn.32–34 (2014).  The Congressional Research Service summed up the lower
court holdings as follows: The Eleventh Circuit and Seventh Circuit have deter-
mined that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test alone controls. See United
States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Exca-
vating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).  Two more circuits, the Ninth and
Fourth Circuits, applied the Kennedy test, but did not address whether the plu-
rality’s standard was also valid. See N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766
(9th Cir. 2011), clarifying N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d
993 (9th Cir. 2007); Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278
(4th Cir. 2011).  Three circuits, the Third, Eighth, and First Circuits, have held
that a wetland satisfying either Justice Kennedy’s test or the plurality’s test is a
jurisdictional wetland. See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174 (3d Cir.
2011); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006).  According to the Congressional Research
Service, no circuit has applied the plurality’s standard exclusively, and the Su-
preme Court has not granted certiorari to resolve this split of authority. MELTZ &
COPELAND, supra, at 7–8.
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B. Recent Regulatory Action
As might be expected, these decisions (the fractured Rapanos deci-
sion, in particular) have injected considerable uncertainty into deter-
mining the limits of CWA jurisdiction.49  In accordance with
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act,50 the EPA and Army
Corps responded to this uncertainty by issuing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in April 2014 to redefine “waters of the United States” in
the CWA regulatory scheme.51
The waters of the U.S. proposal (the “WOTUS” rule52) was met
with considerable backlash from regulated industries.53  Agriculture
groups, builders, energy companies, and other industries opposed the
rule from its release,54 creating a groundswell of congressional opposi-
tion to the proposed rule, amid fears that the rule would give federal
officials expansive new powers over private property and farmland.55
In particular, agriculture groups, including the Nebraska Farm Bu-
reau, expressed concern about regulation of so-called ephemeral
streams (those streams that run only intermittently) and whether the
proposed rule would extend the CWA’s reach such that farmers would
be required to obtain permits to complete normal farming activities
49. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054, 37,055–56 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R.
pts. 110, 112, 116, et al.) (preamble).  The definition of “waters of the United
States” appears in part 33 of the Army Corps’ regulations.  33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)
(2015).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
51. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R.
pts. 110, 112, 116, et al.).
52. EPA originally dubbed the rule the “Waters of the United States” Rule, and then
later rebranded the regulatory effort as the “Clean Water Rule” upon release of
the proposed final rule.
53. See Timothy Cama, Fears of EPA ‘Land Grab’ Create Groundswell Against Water
Rule, THE HILL (June 21, 2014, 1:01 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environ
ment/210130-fears-of-epa-land-grab-create-groundswell-against-water-rule
[https://perma.unl.edu/KF7E-7NSS] (“The House has held a series of hearings on
the water rule to highlight the fierce opposition from agriculture groups, the
stone industry, developers and local governments.”).
54. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, American Farm Bureau Tells
Members to ‘Ditch’ EPA Water Rule (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.fb.org/newsroom/
news_article/42/ [https://perma.unl.edu/H5ZT-XTGA]; Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n
of Home Builders, Clean Water Act Proposal Skirts Federal Law, Harms Small
Businesses (May 29, 2014), http://www.nahb.org/en/news-and-publications/Press-
Releases/2014/april/clean-water-act-proposal-skirts-federal-law—harms-small-
businesses.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/S7DC-6GZ2]; Press Release, Associated
Gen. Contractors of Am., Ditches, Stormwater BMPs and Potholes are Not Wa-
ters of the U.S. (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.agc.org/news/2014/11/14/ditches-
stormwater-bmps-and-potholes-are-not-waters-us [https://perma.unl.edu/Z2TP-
348F].
55. Cama, supra note 53.
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such as crop tillage and fencing.56  In one multi-organization com-
ment, industry groups argued the proposal represented an “unjusti-
fied expansion” of federal jurisdiction under the CWA that would
shoulder businesses with “expansive new definitions” while increas-
ing—not reducing—regulatory uncertainty.57
The EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers published the finalized
rule in June 2015.58  EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy publicly ar-
gued the rule would expand the CWA’s coverage by just 3%59 while
maintaining and expanding exclusions for farming, ranching, and for-
estry.60  In a press release accompanying the release of the final rule,
the EPA claimed the rule would not regulate ditches, shallow subsur-
face flows, or tile drains.61  The EPA also maintained that the rule
would not create any new permitting requirements for agriculture,
while maintaining “all previous exemptions and exclusions.”62
Predictably, the EPA’s assurances did little to placate industry
fears of regulatory overreach.63  On August 28, 2015, the revised defi-
nition of “waters of the United States” became effective.64  Court chal-
lenges to the final rule immediately followed: In September 2015, the
federal district court in North Dakota temporarily enjoined enforce-
ment of the rule in thirteen states.65  About a month later, the Sixth
56. See id. (“ ‘The rule would place features such as ditches, ephemeral drainages,
ponds (natural or man-made [sic], prairie potholes, seeps, flood plains, and other
occasionally or seasonally wet areas under federal control,’ the House lawmakers
wrote in their letter.”).
57. William L. Kovacs, Jeffrey Gunnulfsen & Kraig R. Naasz, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean
Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188 (April 21, 2014); Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2011-
0080 (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/11.12.14-_
multi-organization_comments_to_epa_and_usace_on_proposed_rule_definition_
of_waters_of_the_united_states.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Q2BZ-GP69].
58. See supra note 49.
59. Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s Water War, POLITICO (May 27, 2015, 10:41 AM), http:/
/www.politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule-118319 [https://
perma.unl.edu/CRP3-B45Q].
60. Devin Henry, EPA Chief: We Made ‘Substantial Changes’ to Water Regulations,
THE HILL (May 27, 2015, 3:54 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/
243247-epas-mccarthy-touts-substantial-changes-to-water-rule [https://perma
.unl.edu/BRV5-S6HV].
61. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Water Rule Protects Streams and
Wetlands Critical to Public Health, Communities, and Economy (May 27, 2015),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/62295CDDD6C6B45685257E52004F
AC97 [https://perma.unl.edu/7TRQ-DPVU].
62. Id.
63. See Hopkinson, supra note 59.
64. The EPA’s final WOTUS rule was published in the Federal Register for Monday,
June 29, and became effective sixty days thereafter. See Clean Water Rule: Defi-
nition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,054 (June 29,
2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, et al.).
65. North Dakota v. U.S. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015).
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Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing a challenge to the rules in a multi-
district consolidated action, entered a nationwide stay on enforcement
of the rule.66  Petitioners challenged both the substance of the rule
and the process used by the EPA and the Army Corps in adopting the
rule.67
While this Note does not purport to address the propriety or wis-
dom of the EPA and the Corps’ rulemaking effort, the public interest
in the proposed rule shows that the exact reach of the CWA remains
controversial.  If the rules are upheld, it is possible that the rules
would reduce uncertainty around jurisdictional determinations.  How-
ever, this conclusion is far from certain, since prior iterations have
hardly reduced jurisdictional controversy.68  Even if the final Waters
of the United States rule is ultimately deemed a valid exercise of the
EPA and the Corps’ rulemaking authority under the statute, landown-
ers may still initiate challenges to seek review of the Corps’ jurisdic-
tional determinations.  Their ability to do so immediately upon
receiving an adverse jurisdictional determination is addressed directly
by the Hawkes Co. case.
C. Issues
Judicial review of federal agency action is limited by the case or
controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion69 as well as provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act70
(APA), enabling legislation, and judicially-created doctrines.  The APA
provides for judicial review of “agency action made reviewable by stat-
ute” and “final agency action for which there is no other adequate rem-
edy in a court.”71  In cases seeking immediate judicial review of a
jurisdictional determination where an agency’s enabling statute does
66. Ohio v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (In re EPA), 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015).
Apparently preferring to first litigate the matter in federal district court, chal-
lengers had moved for both stay of the rule and dismissal of their own petition in
the consolidated action, arguing that the Sixth Circuit lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). Id. at 806.  Section 1369(b)(1) provides
for review of certain administrative actions taken pursuant to the Clean Water
Act in the “Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States.”  33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)
(2012).
67. Ohio, 803 F.3d 804.
68. Just as may be the case with the new definition of “waters of the United States,”
regulations defining the “waters of the United States” in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County and Rapanos were sold to the public as clarifications of
existing law and were later applied by the Corps and EPA in ways that were
found to exceed the agencies’ statutory authority. See Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 164 (2001).
69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
70. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012).
71. Id. § 704.
288 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:277
not specifically provide for or preclude judicial review, the court must
first decide if the jurisdictional determination is a “final agency ac-
tion” that leaves plaintiffs with no other adequate remedy in a court.
Second, the court must consider whether the plaintiff’s claim is ripe
for review.72
D. “Final Agency Action”
1. The Bennett Test of Final Agency Action
In Bennett v. Spear,73 the court synthesized its prior holdings on
final agency action to develop a two-part test for determining when an
action is a “final agency action.”  Specifically, the Bennett court held
that in order for an agency action to be reviewable as such, the agency
action must: (1) represent the consummation of the agency’s decision-
making process (i.e., not be tentative or interlocutory in nature) and
(2) determine the rights and obligations of the parties or have legal
consequences to the parties.74  The Bennett test is well-established;
the majority opinion in Hawkes Co. also discussed several other deci-
sions it felt were critical in deciding the finality question.75  However,
the decision that was relied on most heavily by the Hawkes Co. appel-
lant-plaintiffs in their brief76 was the Supreme Court’s relatively re-
cent decision in Sackett v. EPA.77
72. The district court did not reach this question, because it found that the final ju-
risdictional determination was not a final agency action, rendering any question
relating to ripeness immaterial.  Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F.
Supp. 2d 868, 870 (D. Minn. 2013), rev’d, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub
nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).  The
Courts of Appeal are divided over whether § 704’s final agency action require-
ment is jurisdictional—meaning that, if agency action is nonfinal, the court is
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction—or not, meaning that an action challeng-
ing nonfinal agency action would be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
73. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
74. Id. at 177–78 (holding that the action must “mark the ‘consummation’ of the
agency’s decisionmaking process” and that “the action must be one by which
‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences
will flow’”).
75. See Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1000–01 (8th Cir.
2015) (citing and discussing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), abro-
gated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Frozen Food
Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942)), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes
Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
76. Appellant’s Opening Brief, Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d
994 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3067), 2013 WL 6069374; see also Brief of Amici Cu-
riae American Farm Bureau Federation et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and Reversal of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, Hawkes Co.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3067), 2013
WL 6221825 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
77. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
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2. Sackett v. EPA Opens the Door
In Sackett, plaintiffs Michael and Chantell Sackett brought action
to challenge an administrative compliance order issued to them by the
EPA.78  The Sacketts filled part of a lot they owned in Bonner County,
Idaho in preparation to build a house.79  Asserting that their proper-
ties were not “waters of the United States” subject to the permitting
requirements of section 404 of the CWA, the Sacketts deposited fill
materials on the property without obtaining a permit.  The EPA, un-
derstanding the property to be within its jurisdiction, issued a pre-
enforcement compliance order,80 requiring the Sacketts to undertake
restoration activities and carrying a penalty of up to $37,500 per day
for violating the CWA and an additional $37,500 per day or violating
the compliance order.81
The Supreme Court concluded that the compliance order had all
the “hallmarks of APA finality” that prior opinions had established.82
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Sackett that pre-en-
forcement compliance orders were reviewable final agency action con-
flicted with every federal circuit to consider the issue.83  The Court
also rejected argument that the CWA’s statutory scheme precluded ju-
dicial review.84
E. Ripeness
The justiciability of a claim for review is distinct from the issue of
finality.  Ripeness is, of course, a judicially-created doctrine which
flows from Article III’s cases and controversies requirement.  Courts
evaluate the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and the “hard-
ship to the parties of withholding court consideration,” factors that
can both be seen as encompassed by the Bennett test of finality.85  The
Eighth Circuit concluded that—at least in the Hawkes Co. case—its
analysis of the finality question “resolve[d] the ripeness issue as well”
as the two issues were functionally coextensive.86  Accordingly, this
78. Id. at 1369.
79. Id. at 1370.
80. See Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases),
rev’d sub nom. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
81. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369–70 (2012).
82. Id. at 1371–72.
83. See Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 622 F.3d at 1143 (collecting cases).
84. Id. at 1373.
85. See Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1002 n.2 (8th Cir.
2015) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149
(1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)),
aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
86. See id.
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Note does not provide separate, extensive treatment of the ripeness
issue, other than to recognize it as an issue in the case.
III. HAWKES CO. V. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
A. Facts and Administrative History
According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiff Hawkes Co., Inc.
mines peat from wetlands for use in construction of golf greens.87  In
March 2007, Hawkes Co. sought permission from the Army Corps of
Engineers to mine peat on a 530-acre property88 owned by plaintiffs
LPF Properties, LLC and Pierce Investment Co. in Marshall County,
Minnesota.89  Hawkes Co. believed that this property could supply
enough high-quality peat to sustain its mining operation for ten to fif-
teen additional years.90
Predictably, Hawkes Co.’s mining operation would involve the fill-
ing or discharge of material on the property.91  Section 404(a) of the
CWA prohibits the discharge of “dredged or fill material” into “naviga-
ble waters,”92 and the Army Corps is authorized to issue permits for
the discharge of such material into navigable waters, including wet-
lands.93  Hawkes Co. applied for a permit to mine the property in De-
cember 2010.94
The Army Corps made a preliminary jurisdictional determination
(the “preliminary JD”) in 2011, finding that it had CWA jurisdiction
over the property because it was connected to the Red River of the
North, a traditional navigable water.95  In 2012, the Corps issued an
“approved jurisdictional determination” (the “approved JD”).  The dis-
87. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868, 870 (D. Minn.
2013), rev’d, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
88. Plaintiffs Pierce Investment Co. and LPF Properties, LLC own the property in
question.  Under the proposed arrangement, Hawkes Co. would pay royalties to
Pierce and LPF to mine peat on the property.  All three entities (Pierce Invest-
ment Co., LPF Properties, LLC, and Hawkes Co.) are closely-held corporations
owned by members of the Pierce family. Id.
89. Id.  Marshall County covers 1,675 square miles in northwest Minnesota and is
bordered on its western edge by the Red River of the North. See History, MAR-
SHALL COUNTY MINN., http://www.co.marshall.mn.us/residents_visitors/history/
index.php [https://perma.unl.edu/S53K-3Z5V].
90. Hawkes Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
91. Id.
92. Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
93. Id.
94. Hawkes Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 870.  According to the complaint, the parties also
met in January 2011, when Hawkes Co. alleges that the Corps “attempted to
dissuade Plaintiffs from expanding their mining operations, in part by stressing
the time and cost involved in the permitting process.” Id.
95. Id. at 871.  Plaintiffs disputed this finding, arguing that their property had no
continuous connection “to a ‘relatively permanent water.’” See id.
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trict court observed that the Corps apparently abandoned its continu-
ous connection theory, instead concluding in the approved JD that the
property had a “significant nexus” with the Red River of the North.96
Following an administrative appeal, the case was remanded to the
Corps district office for additional fact-finding.  The Corps issued a re-
vised approved jurisdictional determination (the “revised JD”) in De-
cember 2012, concluding that jurisdiction existed.97  The Army Corps
indicated that this was their final determination and that no further
appeals could be taken.98
Plaintiffs then filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive re-
lief.99  The Corps moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to
state a claim.100
B. District Court Decision
In order to resolve the “final agency action” question, the district
court applied the two-part test from Bennett v. Spear.101  Under that
test, an agency action is “final” when it (1) “ ‘mark[s] the consumma-
tion of the agency’s decisionmaking process,’ meaning it must be more
than ‘tentative or interlocutory’ in nature”102 and (2) the action must
determine rights and obligations or be “one from which ‘legal conse-
quences will flow.’”103  Construing the Bennett test narrowly to re-
strict access to judicial review, the court found that the plaintiffs could
not establish both prongs of the test.
Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit and borrowing much of its logic in
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,104
the district court held that the plaintiffs could establish that the re-
vised JD “marked the consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking
process” and satisfied the first Bennett prong.105  The district court
96. Id.  Recall that either the “continuous surface connection” test or the “significant
nexus” test is sufficient for exercise of jurisdiction under the CWA in the Eighth
Circuit.  United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009).
97. Hawkes Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 870.
100. A party may move for dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
a court construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, taking all well-pleaded facts as true. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (explaining sufficient factual allegations,
when such allegations are assumed to be true despite disbelief, must be raised to
overcome a 12(b)(6) motion).
101. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
102. Hawkes Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78).
103. Id.
104. 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008).
105. Hawkes Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
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reasoned that the jurisdictional determination process is not “necessa-
rily contiguous” with the permit application process.106  In its view,
the jurisdictional determination process was a distinct and separate
action leading to a determination that would “remain in place”
through the passage of time, changes in ownership, or other future
events.107
However, the district court found that the revised JD was not a
“final agency action” because, in its view, the revised JD did not “fix
[the] rights or obligations” of the parties and no legal consequences
would flow from the revised JD.108  The district court observed that
the revised JD does not order the plaintiffs to take action, and does
not obligate them to proceed with the permit process.109  The district
court did acknowledge the difficult choice the plaintiffs were forced to
make;110 it nonetheless reasoned that the revised JD did not “sub-
stantially change” the courses of action available to them.  The district
court wrote that despite the Army Corps’ decision, the physical char-
acteristics of the property and legal standards for determining juris-
dictional limits of the CWA remained unchanged.111  Accordingly, the
Corps had not interjected any requirement on the property owners
which had not been provided for in the law.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ Sackett argument112 as un-
persuasive, paying little attention to the strong policy overtones in the
Sackett majority opinion.  In doing so, it reasoned that the compliance
order at issue in Sackett was distinguishable from the revised JD at
issue in Hawkes Co., because the legal consequences flowing from the
Sackett compliance order were more concrete, unavoidable, and imme-
diate than those stemming from the pre-enforcement determination
before the court in this case.113  Further, the court contended that un-
like the petitioners in Sackett, the plaintiffs in Hawkes Co. were not
left without “other adequate remedy in a court,”114 because plaintiffs
may proceed with the permit process and challenge the assertion of
jurisdiction at the consummation of the permit process, or continue
with the planned mining and wait to challenge jurisdiction when and
106. Id.
107. Id. at 873–74.
108. Id. at 874–75.
109. Id. at 875.
110. Id. (“While Plaintiffs do have a difficult choice to make regarding how to proceed,
their options did not substantially change because of the jurisdictional
determination.”).
111. Id.
112. Id. (“Plaintiffs argue the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Sackett v.
EPA . . . overruled these decisions.”).
113. Id. at 876–77.
114. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).  A party seeking judicial review must not only show
that the agency action they challenge is a “final agency action,” but also that they
have no other adequate remedy in court.  Id.
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if the EPA brings an enforcement action.115  In Sackett, the Supreme
Court held the latter to be an insufficient remedy,116 but the district
court in Hawkes Co. reasoned that since the plaintiffs have at least
one other remedy, the determination was not reviewable.117  The dis-
trict court then dismissed the action.118
C. Eighth Circuit’s Opinion and Holding
Plaintiffs appealed from dismissal to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the revised JD was a
“final agency action” for which judicial review was immediately avail-
able and that the claim was ripe for review.119  Accordingly, the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Judge Loken’s majority opinion takes a practical, law-in-action ap-
proach in applying the two-prong Bennett test, injecting far more dis-
cussion regarding the regulatory impact of denying judicial review
after the issuance of a final, approved JD than the Belle court.120  Like
the district court (and every other Circuit Court to consider the is-
sue121) the Eighth Circuit panel agreed with plaintiffs that the first
prong of the Bennett test was satisfied.122  In support of this, the court
noted that the Army Corps itself describes approved JDs as “defini-
tive, official determination that there are, or that there are not, juris-
dictional ‘waters of the United States’ on a site” which “can be relied
upon by a landowner.”123  Further the court found that the Army
Corps’ argument that the JD could be revised in the future was of
little consequence, since the possibility of reconsideration is not
enough to strip the revised JD at issue in Hawkes Co. of its “final”
status.124
However, in contrast to the district court, the Eighth Circuit held
that the second part of the Bennett test was satisfied.125  In its view,
115. Hawkes Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
116. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
117. Hawkes Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 878.  The district court in Hawkes Co. noted at
the end of its opinion that Sackett may open the door to a third option—begin
mining on the property, wait for a compliance order from EPA, and challenge it in
court. Id.  Presumably, this would not necessarily absolve the landowner of po-
tential liability which occurs as a result of beginning mining.
118. Id.
119. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1002 (8th Cir. 2015),
aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
120. See id. at 1000–01.
121. See Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 389–91 (5th Cir. 2014);
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 591 (9th
Cir. 2008).
122. Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 999.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1001.
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the lower court seriously underestimated the impact of the revised JD
when it reached its conclusion that no rights or obligations were deter-
mined and that no legal consequences would flow from the revised
JD.126  In the majority’s view, the district court exaggerated the dis-
tinction between “an agency order that compels affirmative action,
and an order that prohibits a party from taking [an] otherwise lawful
action.”127  A close reading of the opinion suggests that the majority
construes “rights and obligations” and “legal consequences” more
broadly than the lower court.
The Eighth Circuit also took issue with the district court’s finding
that the revised JD left plaintiffs with an adequate judicial remedy.128
On this point, the court found Hawkes Co. virtually indistinguishable
from Sackett.  In its view, neither of the options available to the plain-
tiffs to obtain further review (completing the permitting process or
commencing mining, running the risk of enforcement action by EPA)
was an adequate judicial remedy.129  Again, the majority discussed
the practical implications of its decision.  Specifically, the court re-
ferred back to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and inferred from the
Corps’ statements to plaintiffs that the permit “would ultimately be
refused.”130  Taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true (as is
proper on a motion to dismiss), it made little sense to the majority why
the lower court felt that going through the permitting process, at sig-
nificant cost and sacrifice of time,131 was an adequate judicial rem-
edy.132  The court reacted even less enthusiastically to the lower
court’s suggestion that the plaintiffs could commence peat mining and
wait for enforcement action, since the majority believed that this
would subject appellants to significant potential liability.133  Specifi-
cally, the majority raised a cautionary note regarding such a strategy.
Commencing mining and choosing to disregard the revised JD would
expose plaintiffs to “substantial criminal monetary penalties and even
imprisonment for a knowing CWA violation.”134  This, in turn, led the
majority to posit that the Corps’ actions amounted to a litigation strat-
126. Id. at 1000.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See id. at 1001.  Recall that § 704 provides for judicial review of “final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court.”  5 U.S.C. § 704
(2012).
129. Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 1001.
130. Id. (emphasis in original).
131. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (“The average applicant
for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process,
and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and
$28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design changes.”).
132. Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 1001.
133. Id.
134. Id.  As the majority pointed out, this would be the plaintiffs’ reward for being
forthright and seeking a JD in the first place. Id.
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egy that leaves property owners with little remedy except to comply
with Army Corps demands to drop the project, or begin the permitting
process.135 Sackett, the court said, was concerned with how the lack of
judicial review would in effect allow the EPA and the Corps to “strong-
arm[ ]” parties into compliance.136  The court concluded that similar
practical impacts to the plaintiffs logically dictated the same result
here, and found that the revised JD was a “final agency action” for
which judicial review was available.137
The majority disposed of the ripeness issue in just a few sentences.
In a footnote, the court acknowledged the standard for ripeness, and
found that as applied in this case, the analysis required for an assess-
ment of ripeness was functionally coextensive with its “final agency
action” analysis.138  In turn, this issue was resolved with little addi-
tional analysis.139
D. Judge Kelly’s Concurring Opinion
While agreeing with the outcome and generally agreeing with the
majority’s opinion, Judge Kelly displayed that she had some misgiv-
ings about the doctrinal basis for the majority’s conclusion.140  In her
concurring opinion, Judge Kelly wrote that like the majority, she could
not countenance the position in which disallowing immediate judicial
review would place the plaintiffs, finding that none of the district
court’s proffered “adequate remed[ies]” were truly adequate as applied
to Hawkes Co. and the other plaintiffs.141
Like the district court and majority, Judge Kelly saw the critical
issue of the case to be the resolution of the second prong of the Bennett
test—whether the revised JD at issue in the case was an order by
which rights and obligations of the parties were determined or from
which legal consequences would flow.142  This, Judge Kelly reasoned,
made the ultimate decision of whether the revised JD constituted a
“final agency action” a “close question,” and in explaining her reason-
ing, she acknowledged as valid the rationale advanced by the district
135. Id. at 1001–02.
136. Id. at 1002.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1002 n.2.
139. Id. at 1002.
140. Id. at 1002–03 (Kelly, J., concurring).  In particular, Judge Kelly expressed con-
cern that unlike Sackett v. EPA, the potential for increased civil penalties result-
ing from disregarding a jurisdictional determination were more “speculative”
than those present in Hawkes Co.  Id. at 1003.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1002–03.
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court, while in some regards exposing the weaknesses of the majority’s
reasoning.143
Specifically, Judge Kelly noted the heavy reliance that the majority
placed on the practical outcome that would befall the plaintiffs in this
case, implying that this reliance may lead to short-sightedness with
regard to the legal precedent established by the majority.144  In the
end, however, practical impacts won the day: “In my view, the Court
in Sackett,” Judge Kelly wrote, “was concerned with just how difficult
and confusing it can be for a landowner to predict whether or not his
or her land falls within CWA jurisdiction . . . .  This jurisdictional de-
termination was precisely what the Court deemed reviewable in
Sackett.”145
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Supreme Court Review of Hawkes Co.
As previously mentioned, the Army Corps filed a petition for certio-
rari146 in September 2015 with the Supreme Court, seeking review of
the Eighth Circuit’s decision.  In December 2015, the Supreme Court
granted the Government’s petition for certiorari.147  The Supreme
Court later affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit, relying on
much the same logic as the Eighth Circuit.148  This piece focuses on
the Eighth Circuit’s initial decision, which this Note argues correctly
opened the door to expanded judicial review in these cases.
It is clear that the Supreme Court was justified in granting certio-
rari in this case.  Specifically, the existence of a substantial and im-
portant federal question, an irreconcilable split of authority among
three of the federal circuit courts, and a potential misapplication of
143. Id. (“However, I question how much weight should be given to the futility of the
permit application for an individual applicant, or the time and cost spent apply-
ing, in determining whether or not the JD constitutes a final agency action. . . .  I
agree with the other courts that have considered this issue that any penalties
resulting from a JD are far more ‘speculative’ than those threatened in Sackett.”).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136
S. Ct. 615 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2015) (No. 15-290), 2015 WL 5265284.  The Supreme
Court today grants certiorari on only about one percent of the petitions for review
it receives.  Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative
Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011).
147. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3119 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2015) (No. 15-290).
148. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). Tracking the
Eighth Circuit, the Court held that the revised JD was final agency action, id. at
1813–14, and that the alternatives to judicial review available to Hawkes Co.
were inadequate. Id. at 1815.
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the Court’s prior holding in Sackett support authoritative resolution of
this issue—and not a 4–4 split leaving the circuit split unresolved.
As discussed previously, at least three federal circuit courts have
now ruled on the narrow question of whether a pre-enforcement action
(i.e., the final approved jurisdictional determination) is final agency
action for which there is no adequate remedy in court.149  Impor-
tantly, two of these courts (the Eighth and Fifth Circuits) had the ben-
efit of the Court’s prior decision in Sackett, and still reached opposite
conclusions.150  The Ninth Circuit, reviewing this same question in its
Fairbanks North Star Borough decision, sided with the government
and held that an approved jurisdictional determination issued by the
Army Corps was not a reviewable agency action.151
Resolution of conflicts amongst the federal circuit courts of appeals
and state courts concerning the meaning of federal law remains the
“principal purpose” of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.152  Even
though Congress can resolve a split of authority resulting from com-
peting interpretations of a statute like section 704, the Court has said
that the task of resolving a conflict is “initially and primarily” within
its purview.153
The government’s petition for certiorari154 in this case was also en-
hanced because of the substantial and important federal question ad-
vanced by the Hawkes Co. case.  While the Court rarely offers
rationale for its certiorari decisions,155 cases which raise questions re-
lating to the administration of federal law and the construction of fed-
eral statutes rather routinely lead to grants of certiorari,156 as one
149. With the Eighth Circuit’s decision in the Hawkes Co. case, the Eighth, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits have decided this question in previous cases.
150. The Fifth Circuit in Belle Co. found that the second prong of the Bennett test was
not satisfied. See Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 393–94
(5th Cir. 2014).
151. See Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586,
593–96 (9th Cir. 2008).
152. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) (mentioning SUP. CT. R. 10.1).
Indeed, Justice White publicly advanced his view that the Supreme Court should
resolve as many circuit splits as possible.  Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon,
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219,
1242 (2012).  Justice White voted to grant plenary review an average of 215.6
times each Term between 1986 and 1992. Id. at 1241 n.92.
153. Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348.
154. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146.
155. See Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227,
1248 (1979) (“The Court then grants or denies the petition for certiorari, almost
always without an opinion for the Court. . . .  The Supreme Court has always
been reticent about the process by which it decides whether to grant the petition
for certiorari.”).
156. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 522 (1971) (“Certiorari was
granted . . . because the case appeared to raise important questions relating to
the administration and enforcement of the revenue laws, and because the courts
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would expect.  Resolution of the narrow question of finality presented
in Hawkes Co. has the potential to bring the confines of “final agency
action” under Section 704 into greater focus.  Further, the interest of
amici curiae157 in this case at the Court of Appeals level indicate the
national importance and significance of the Court’s resolution of this
matter.
Finally, the potential misapplication of the Supreme Court’s prior
holding in Sackett provides strong support for authoritative resolution
of this issue.158  As noted previously, the plaintiffs in Hawkes Co.
maintained, and the Eighth Circuit agreed, that the Sackett holding
controlled the outcome of Hawkes Co.159  While the Belle court distin-
guished Sackett by contrasting the compliance order at issue in that
case with the final jurisdictional determination in Belle, it seems
likely that five justices from the unanimous opinion in Sackett may
see fit to resolve the conflict and further clarify their holding in Sack-
ett.  In particular, Justice Alito delivered a strong critique of the gov-
ernment’s position in Sackett, reasoning in his concurrence that the
government’s view would subjugate private property rights to EPA
bureaucrats.160
B. Revisiting Hawkes Co. in the Supreme Court
Hawkes Co. presented the Court with an administrative question
with important impacts for property owners, and for various reasons,
this Note takes the position that the Court correctly affirmed the
Eighth Circuit’s decision.  Specifically, this Note argues that (1) Sack-
ett’s holding is broad enough to encompass the issues presented by
Hawkes Co.; (2) Supreme Court precedents construing Section 704
have advanced the pragmatic approach to finality employed by the
Eighth Circuit in Hawkes Co.; and (3) the legislative history of the
APA reflects Congressional intent to create a presumption of judicial
reviewability.
of appeals have differed in their reading . . . .”), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 26 U.S.C. § 7609 (2012); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 151
(1963) (“Because the decision below involves an important question in the con-
struction of the Federal Tort Claims Act and because two Courts of Appeals had
previously reached a contrary result, we granted certiorari.”).
157. Before the Eighth Circuit, the American Farm Bureau Federation, American Pe-
troleum Institute, Foundation for Environmental and Economic Progress, Na-
tional Association of Home Builders, National Mining Association, and Utility
Water Group submitted a joint brief in support of the plaintiffs-appellants,
Hawkes Co.  Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76.
158. See SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (noting that certiorari may be justified where a “United
States court of appeals . . . has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with relevant decisions” of the Supreme Court).
159. See Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1002 (8th Cir. 2015),
aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
160. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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1. Sackett Controls
First, the Court’s prior ruling in Sackett is likely broad enough to
encompass the issues presented by Hawkes Co., because, as the
Eighth Circuit found, the same factors which led the Court to find that
the EPA’s compliance order was subject to judicial review in Sackett
are also present in Hawkes Co.  The plaintiffs in Hawkes Co.
presented several compelling arguments that Sackett resolves the fi-
nality question, since in its view, the jurisdictional determination at
issue in Hawkes Co. is functionally indistinguishable from the compli-
ance order in Sackett.161
a. Applying the First Prong of the Bennett Test
In order for the revised jurisdictional determination at issue in
Hawkes Co. to be a “final agency action,” under section 704, plaintiffs
must have shown that the action “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the
agency’s decisionmaking process.”162  While the Corps takes pains to
advance the argument that the jurisdictional determination does not
satisfy this prong, a number of courts (including the Hawkes Co. trial
court) applying the Bennett test of finality to jurisdictional determina-
tions have concluded that the jurisdictional determination does in fact
mark the consummation of agency action.163
Specifically, the Corps argues that the jurisdictional determination
is “only the beginning of the administrative process, not the end,” and
that the jurisdictional determination is an informational tool designed
to help plaintiffs “navigate potential permitting issues.”164  As plain-
tiffs in Hawkes Co. correctly observe, the Sackett court focused on the
lack of additional formal agency review mechanisms for the compli-
ance order.165  The Eighth Circuit agreed that the revised jurisdic-
tional determination, deemed “final” by the Army Corps itself,
represented the consummation of an agency decision making
process.166
It is this focus on the availability of further formal agency review
which guided the Supreme Court’s analysis of this prong of the test in
Sackett, and which applies with equal force to this case.  The Corps
itself has informed the Hawkes Co. plaintiffs that they have exhausted
161. See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 76.
162. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).
163. See Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868, 873 (D. Minn.
2013), rev’d, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016); Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2008).
164. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs at 45, Hawkes Co.,
782 F.3d 994 (No. 13-3067), 2013 WL 6823950 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
165. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 76, at 11.
166. Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 999.
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their administrative appeals with regard to the jurisdictional determi-
nation.  The government’s arguments, with their focus on the early-
stage nature of the jurisdictional determination in the entire CWA
permitting process167 miss the salient point: as to the threshold deter-
mination of Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA, the agency’s revised
jurisdictional determination represents the consummation of its deci-
sion-making process on that issue.  As Justice Scalia wrote in Sackett,
“[t]he mere possibility that an agency might reconsider . . . does not
suffice to make an otherwise final agency action nonfinal.”168  It is
untenable to imagine that the Army Corps would go through the effort
of an initial administrative appeal (which the Hawkes Co. plaintiffs
availed themselves of) and label a determination as “final,” simply to
later consider the product of such efforts preliminary or interlocutory
in nature.169  Thus, Sackett supports the holding of courts which had
previously found that jurisdictional determinations satisfy the first-
prong of the Bennett test.
b. Applying the Second Prong of the Bennett Test
The second prong of the Bennett test, and the one on which the
Eighth Circuit focused the bulk of its analysis, asks whether the
agency action in question is one by which “legal consequences will
flow” or by which “rights or obligations have been determined.”170  As
a preliminary matter, it is worth highlighting a key feature of this
prong of the Bennett test; a party must show that legal consequences
will flow from the agency action or that the agency action is one which
determines rights or obligations.  Thus, it seems that either condition
is sufficient to satisfy this portion of the Bennett test.
The Government vigorously contends, and the trial court agreed,
that the distinct legal obligations created by the compliance order at
issue in Sackett distinguished that case from Hawkes Co.171  This
view, rejected by the Eighth Circuit,172 asserts that because the com-
pliance order required the landowners to take affirmative action to
167. Brief for Appellee, supra note 164, at 45–46.
168. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (2012).
169. See Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 997–98.  The Army Corps first provided the Hawkes
Co. plaintiffs with a preliminary jurisdictional determination (JD), then a “draft”
JD, and then an “Approved JD.” Id. at 998.  The Army Corps later revised its
findings in a revised JD, and told the appellants that this was the “final Corps
permit decision.” Id.
170. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997).
171. See Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868, 874–75 (D.
Minn. 2013), rev’d, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
172. See Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 1000 (“By contrast, the district court reasoned, ap-
pellants ‘face no such obligations or changes in their rights as a result of their
jurisdictional determination.’”).
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restore the property or face penalties, it was different from a jurisdic-
tional determination that require plaintiffs to continue the permitting
process to seek review or risk enforcement action.173
However, a close reading of Sackett reveals that this contrast may
be nothing more than a distinction without a difference.  As the
Eighth Circuit observed, the Corps may simply exaggerate the distinc-
tion between orders requiring affirmative action and those prohibiting
action.174  While Sackett imposes legal consequences insofar as the
landowners in that case face penalties for any failure to comply with
the Government’s order, if the plaintiffs in Hawkes Co. plan to go for-
ward with their plan to mine peat on their property, they must subject
themselves to a permitting process or run the risk of facing the very
same penalties as the parties in Sackett.  While it is true that the Su-
preme Court has said that requiring participation in an administra-
tive process is not a legal consequence,175 cases evincing this view are
factually dissimilar from the facts of this case, where the imposition of
a permitting requirement could cost the Hawkes Co. plaintiffs hun-
dreds of thousands and months of delays.176  As a practical matter,
the permitting requirement does not require mere participation in an
adjudication, but rather the financing of expensive and time consum-
ing environmental reviews which, based on statements of local Corps
employees,177 may prove futile in actually netting Hawkes Co. and its
affiliates the permit they desire.
Further, as the Eighth Circuit acknowledged, disregarding the ju-
risdictional determination has serious consequences for the property
owners, including risks of criminal sanctions resulting from a knowing
173. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 164, at 23–29 (alteration in original) (“The ju-
risdictional determination does not command Hawkes to take any action, and it
does not prohibit Hawkes from taking any action. . . .  The jurisdictional determi-
nation ‘does not itself command [the property owner] to do or forbear from
anything . . . .”).
174. See Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 1000 (“In our view, this analysis seriously under-
states the impact of the regulatory action at issue by exaggerating the distinction
between an agency order that compels affirmative action, and an order that pro-
hibits a party from taking otherwise lawful action.”).
175. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 164, at 26 (citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449
U.S. 232, 239–43 (1980)).
176. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (“The average applicant
for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process,
and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and
$28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design changes.”).
177. According to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, an Army Corps representative
told Hawkes Co. management that a permit would take years and be very costly.
On another occasion, an Army Corps representative allegedly told a Hawkes Co.
employee that “he should start looking for another job,” implying that the pro-
posed peat mining site would not be permitted by EPA and the Army Corps.
Hawkes Co., 782 F.3d at 998.
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violation of the CWA.178  The Government argued in its Eighth Circuit
brief that it is the CWA itself which creates these penalties, not the
jurisdictional determination.179
This argument does little to refute the core premise of the land-
owners.  They argue that because the jurisdictional determination
puts the landowner on notice of the Corps’ position with regard to its
jurisdiction, the parties are forced into a permitting process required
by a statute which they maintain does not apply to their property.180
As a consequence, just as the compliance order in Sackett was found to
determine the parties’ rights and obligations, the jurisdictional deter-
mination can be said to determine rights and obligations of the prop-
erty owner by restricting the landowners’ free use of their property
until a final resolution is made.
c. Sackett Contemplates Jurisdictional Determinations
The argument which is perhaps most persuasive in showing that
Sackett controls the outcome of Hawkes is language in both the unani-
mous opinion of the court and concurring opinions181 which indicates
that the Justices understood their decision would not only open the
door to judicial review in cases involving compliance orders, but also
to those cases involving jurisdictional determinations, the question ex-
plicitly addressed in Hawkes Co.
As a matter of necessity, the compliance order in Sackett itself con-
tains a jurisdictional determination.182  Such a conclusion is only logi-
cal; in order for the EPA to issue a compliance order, it must
necessarily have thought the property in question was subject to its
jurisdiction.  The question addressed in Sackett was whether the
Sacketts could challenge the jurisdictional determination upon receiv-
ing the compliance order.  As the majority wrote, there is little reason
to think that Congress intended to authorize the “strong-arming of
regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity
for judicial review—even judicial review of the question [of] whether
the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.”183  Justice Gins-
burg clarified in her concurrence that she did not read the majority
opinion to authorize the Sacketts to challenge the “terms and condi-
178. Id. at 1001.
179. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 164, at 23–26.
180. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 76, at 17.
181. In Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous
court.  Justice Ginsburg and Justice Alito each wrote separate concurring opin-
ions.  Id. at 1374–76.
182. See id. at 1371 (“The Sacketts, who do not believe that their property is subject to
the [Clean Water] Act, asked the EPA for a hearing, but that request was denied.
They then brought this action in the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho . . . .”).
183. Id. at 1374.
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tions of the compliance order,” at the pre-enforcement stage, but
rather only the “EPA’s authority to regulate their land.”184  If review
of the compliance order’s terms was not in play, then what is?  The
answer is almost certainly the Corps’ jurisdiction in the first place.
Buttressing this claim, Justice Alito used the phrase “jurisdictional
determination” explicitly, writing that the decision would afford prop-
erty owners the right “to challenge the EPA’s jurisdictional determi-
nation” under the APA.185  Taken together, these statements provide
ample support for the Eighth Circuit’s decision to rely on Sackett in
resolving the issues presented by Hawkes Co.
2. The Supreme Court’s Finality Jurisprudence Has Always
Embraced a Pragmatic Approach
Both Sackett and earlier Supreme Court cases addressing finality
of agency action have employed the same pragmatic approach to the
issue of finality advanced by the Eighth Circuit.  As previously dis-
cussed in section D of Part III, Judge Kelly of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals indicated her concern with resting so much of the court’s
judgment on practical impacts that a contrary holding would have had
on the landowners in that case.186  Specifically, Judge Kelly noted
that the Eighth Circuit resolved the close question of whether or not
the agency action at issue was one from which “legal consequences
flow” or by which the parties’ “rights or obligations” were fixed by
looking extensively at the implications of the court’s decision on this
case, openly wondering if the analysis employed by the majority gave
too much weight to the “futility of the permit application for an indi-
vidual applicant, or the time and cost spent applying . . . .”187  While
this represents a valid concern, especially since the decision rendered
in this case has the potential to impact finality decisions made outside
of the CWA regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court’s prior jurispru-
dence indicates that the Court has long taken a pragmatic approach to
determining agency finality issues, including looking at the impacts of
its finality decisions on the administrative process and litigants.188
Before the Supreme Court synthesized its test of finality in Ben-
nett, its decisions routinely evidenced a pragmatic view of finality.  For
example, in an early case, Frozen Food Express v. United States,189 a
federal agency determined that a commodity shipped by the plaintiff,
184. Id. at 1374–75 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
186. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1002–03 (8th Cir. 2015)
(Kelly, J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,
136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
187. Id. at 1003.
188. See, e.g., Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 779 (1983).
189. 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
304 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:277
a motor carrier, was not exempt from regulation under the Interstate
Commerce Act as agricultural commodity, and the motor carrier sued,
seeking judicial review of this determination.190  The Court found that
the determination was subject to judicial review, specifically noting
the “immediate and practical impact [of the determination] on carriers
who are transporting the commodities.”191
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner192 involved thirty-seven pharma-
ceutical companies who brought action to challenge mandatory label-
ing regulations promulgated under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.193  The Court found that the regulations were final for
purposes of Section 704.194  Citing another early finality decision (one
which predates the APA), Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States,195 the Court found that the regulations were reviewable even
though the promulgating agency had yet to take an enforcement ac-
tion.196  While it’s perhaps more obvious that final rules are final
agency action because of the distinct obligation those rules create, the
pre-enforcement determination at issue in Hawkes Co. is comparable
insofar as it acts as more than merely guidance or advice from the
agency—it informs landowners of the Corps’ position with respect to
jurisdiction over the property and potentially opens the door to know-
ing violations of the Clean Water Act.
In Bell v. New Jersey,197 the Court held that a State could seek
judicial review of a Department of Education decision finding that the
State misused federal funds.  The States sought judicial review under
provisions of the organic statutes at issue, the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act and General Education Provisions Act, both of
which the Court construed to required that agency action be “final” for
the action to be reviewable, like APA Section 704.198  Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, explicitly noted that the Supreme
Court’s cases have “interpreted pragmatically” the requirement of ad-
ministrative finality, with emphasis on whether judicial review at the
relevant time would “disrupt the administrative process.”199  Further,
the Bennett case, which itself prescribes the two-part test used by the
courts to resolve finality issues, takes a similar approach to finality of
190. Id. at 41–42.
191. Id. at 43–44.
192. 387 U.S. 136 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99 (1977).
193. Id. at 137–38.
194. Id. at 149.
195. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
196. Id. at 425.
197. 461 U.S. 773 (1983).
198. See id. at 777–78.
199. Id. at 779 (citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980); Port of Bos.
Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970)).
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agency action.  The Court found that the challenged agency action was
final, in part, because the action “alter[ed] the legal regime” to which
the litigants were subject.200
Tellingly, several of these cases were appropriately cited and dis-
cussed in the Eighth Circuit’s opinion.201  Under the facts of Hawkes
Co., the agency’s decision disallowing judicial review in the Hawkes
Co. case would have the practical effect of forcing Hawkes Co. to
choose between two equally unappetizing options: proceed through the
(perhaps entirely unnecessary) permitting process, at a substantial
cost and delay, or go forward with the project, risking civil and crimi-
nal liability for violations of the CWA.202  The negative and substan-
tial effects of disallowing immediate judicial review are precisely the
kinds of pragmatic considerations that have long led the Supreme
Court to grant judicial review.
3. Allowing Judicial Review is Consistent with the Legislative
History of the APA
Finally, the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the revised jurisdictional
determination in Hawkes Co. is subject to immediate judicial review is
consistent with Congress’s intent to make judicial review widely avail-
able to litigants through the APA.  Modernly, it is well understood
that agency actions are subject to a presumption of reviewability, and
at least one plausible explanation for this is that the APA itself,
through its judicial review provisions, codified a presumption of judi-
cial reviewability.203
Perhaps the most powerful evidence in favor of a presumption of
judicial reviewability is found in the legislative history of the APA.
The history reflects a view that statutes “very rarely” withhold judi-
cial review, since Congress itself has an interest in ensuring that its
statutes are “judicially confined to the scope of authority granted or to
the objectives specified.”204  Further, the legislative history rejects the
“fundamental inconsistency” in forcing persons to continually exhaust
administrative remedies.205  Both provisions support the assertion
that Congress intended judicial review to be widely available, and that
200. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997).
201. See Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1000–01 (8th Cir.
2015) (Kelly, J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes
Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
202. See id. at 1001.
203. See Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1289–90, 1303 (2014).  In his article, Bagley quibbles with this notion,
however, arguing that the APA does not confer such a presumption. Id. at
1304–05.
204. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 275 (1946).
205. Id. at 277.
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a presumption in favor of judicial review should operate to favor land-
owners in close cases like Hawkes Co.
V. CONCLUSION
Just as they were at the time of the CWA’s enactment in 1972,
water quality issues remain a national issue of foremost importance,
with implications that affect every American citizen.  More than forty
years after its passage, the CWA can take credit for significant reduc-
tions in surface water pollution and wetlands losses.  However, long-
standing statutory uncertainty surrounding the jurisdictional reach of
the CWA has led to conflict between landowners and the federal agen-
cies responsible for protecting our nation’s waters.  While rulemaking
may ultimately inject more certainty into the jurisdictional struggles,
it is just as likely that landowners will continue to have colorable chal-
lenges to assertion of jurisdiction over their property under the CWA.
Before the Eighth Circuit ruled in Hawkes Co. v. Army Corps of
Engineers, property owners receiving an adverse jurisdictional deter-
mination were faced with two unappetizing options.  They could seek a
permit under the CWA, at significant cost and delay, or commence pos-
sibly prohibited activities and face potential criminal and civil liability
for violating the CWA.  The Eighth Circuit’s holding correctly applied
the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Sackett v. EPA, a case which
addressed a clearly analogous set of facts.
Despite the modest relief that Hawkes Co. provided to landowners
in Eighth Circuit, it also created a split of authority between the fed-
eral circuits on a question of national importance, making resolution
of this issue important.  The Supreme Court correctly affirmed the
judgment of the Eighth Circuit, because the case is properly controlled
by the Court’s prior decision in Sackett.  Further, the Court should
affirm the Eighth Circuit because the Eighth Circuit properly took a
pragmatic view of finality, in accordance with long-standing Supreme
Court precedent.  Finally, the legislative history of the APA supports a
presumption of judicial reviewability, which favors allowing judicial
review, particularly in a close case.
While the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hawkes may have “muddied
the water” in the short run by creating a clear split of authority with
two other federal circuits, it is possible that we will come to remember
Hawkes Co. as the decision that cleared the way for more abundantly
available judicial review of agency adjudications, checking federal reg-
ulatory agencies who overstep their authority under the law.
